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Abstract: There is a widely held view that global private 
standards would eventually replace the national regulatory 
institutions in developing countries. The purpose of our paper is 
to suggest an alternative view to the above. We consider the 
capacity of regulatory institutions in developing country can be 
strengthened in the global context. We will look at the quality 
and sanitation standards for food and agricultural products, with 
cases of salmon farming industry in Chile and the fresh 
agricultural products in Mexico.  The national regulatory 
institutions have been traditionally strong for food and 
agricultural sector. Two cases illustrate that role of national 
regulatory institution is still important but performs different 
functions in the present-day context.  
   Keywords: Standards, National regulatory institutions, Capacity 
building, Agro-food, Chile, Mexico 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
   The use of global standards has increased as the developing 
countries are incorporated into global productive chains. In 
such context, regulatory institutions are required to adapt 
global standards for safety, quality, security, environmental, 
and social criteria to stay competitive through gaining 
efficiency while accommodating diverse market preferences. 
In other words, national institutions are under pressure by 
international forces to meet the global needs instead of acting 
as independent regulators, promoters and developers of 
standards as the globalization prevails [1], [2], [3], [4]. 
   It is often considered that use of global private standards is 
disadvantageous for developing countries due to their limited 
political power for negotiation [5]; however, we consider this 
can also be a learning opportunity for the regulatory 
institutions in developing countries. We look at the case 
studies of food and agriculture products—namely fresh 
vegetables in Mexico and farmed salmon in Chile.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. New functions of standards in globalizing economy 
   In general, standards support both conformity and diversity: 
they act as “external points of reference” [6] for assessing the 
performance, quality and physical characteristics of products 
or services. Standards perform four broad types of functions to  
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define: (1) interfaces and compatibility; (2) minimum quality; 
(3) achieving reduction of variety; and (4) standards of 
information and production description [7]. In agro-food 
sector, standards were conventionally established and used by 
the public sector to mark the minimum quality and sanitation 
to facilitate the exchange of commodities while ensuring the 
public safety.  
    Arguably, present-day private sector has a much bigger role 
in deciding the content of standards compared to that in the 
past [8]. In fact, standards are increasingly being set and 
diffused by supranational bodies such as EU, private entities 
(such as ISO) or International NGOs (such as Forestry 
Stewardship Council: FSC and Marine Stewardship Council: 
MSC), monitored and executed by different private entities 
(such as auditing firms). This seems to demonstrate the 
diminishing the role of national regulatory institutions in 
setting, monitoring and executing standards.   
   Reference [9], from global value chain perspective, claimed 
that increased use of global private standards had assigned 
different governance powers—legislative (rule-setting), 
executive (assisting/diffusion) and judicial (monitoring)—to 
different private entities.  
   For instance, in case of ISO standards, the legislative power 
belongs to Committee of ISOs which sets the standards, the 
executive power rests within consultancies or other 
organizations with knowledge on the standards and the 
judicial power rests within auditing firms which monitor the 
firms in certification process.  
   That argument is in line with [1] and [3], who viewed 
globalization process as spread of superterriotriality and 
thereby loss of national regulatory power. From that notion, 
there should be an allocation or transfer of the power of 
national governments upward to supranational bodies (i.e 
WTO, GATT, EU, NAFTA etc) and downwards to more local 
levels of government [2]. Furthermore, the developing 
countries’ regulatory power will be even more threatened as 
[10] hints the potential of supragovernmental forces falling 
into the imperial claim: “activists from wealthy countries 
threaten to get their consumers to boycott commodities that do 
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not meet their standards, thus forcing producers in developing 
countries to conform to developed country standards”.  
   In fact, reference [5] claimed that compliance with private-
led standards such as ISO 14000 may be disadvantageous to 
developing countries, due to lack of financial and political 
power in effectively influencing the determination of the 
contents of the standards. 
 
B. Impact of global private standards on national regulatory bodies 
   The previous views can lead to believe that the regulatory 
function of national institutions in developing countries would 
eventually be replaced by the global ones as the industry is 
integrated globally with increase use of private standards. This 
is due to: (1) lack or weak capacity of national regulatory 
institutions [11] and/or (2) presence of strong interests by 
global buyers to coordinate producers at ‘arms’ length’ [12], 
[13], and [14].   
   On the other hand, several studies considered that ‘global 
private standards’ may create positive impacts to national and 
local institutions in developing countries as the standards 
compliance would:  (1) decrease financial burden for 
searching for the right product/service specification [15]; (2) 
enhance learning through global interaction with global buyers 
[16]; (3) enhance knowledge and understanding of the sector 
[17]; (4) facilitate to share knowledge among local 
stakeholders in the same global chain and strengthen the local 
linkages[18].  
   Existing studies of global private standards mainly looked at 
the firm-level capacity building process [12], [19], [20], [13]. 
Some looked at the impact on capacity building at institutional 
levels but limited to the industrial associations [21], [13]. The 
capacity building process of national and local regulatory 
institutions, as they interact with global economy and local 
private firms, is not yet well documented.   
   The issue of standards in the agro-food sector is of great 
concern for the developing countries because agricultural and 
food products comprise greater proportion of their exports 
[22]. Furthermore, agricultural standards have much to 
contribute to the historical discussion on trade and commodity 
trap [23], [24] by converting commodities into the ‘produce’ 
to increase its value added.   
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
   This paper tires to illustrate the capacity building process of 
the national regulatory institutions as they interact with global 
market and private firms, looking at the Latin American cases 
of the Chilean farmed salmon and Mexican fresh vegetables. 
The Chilean case looks at chronological development of 
different incidents of compliance with standards to illustrate 
the changes in the way the public and private institutions 
interact while Mexican case looks at how both public and 
private sector confront the challenges on standards differently 
in comparative manner. Here, we attempt to identify “who” is 
playing “what” role with regards to standards compliance, 
adopting reference [9]’s distinctions on governance powers: 
legislative (rule-setting), executive (rule supporting /diffusion) 
and judicial (rule- enforcing/monitoring).   
   Both case studies are constructed with secondary and 
qualitative data collected during the fieldwork. The case of 
salmon is based on 46 open-ended semi structured interviews 
and 62 semi-structured firm-level surveys conducted during 
March-May, 2004 in Chile. The Mexican cases used open-
ended semi-structured interviews and questionnaires applied 
to 18 firms and two industry associations during November 
2007 - April 2008. For both cases, additional information was 
supplemented with the secondary documents. 
 
 
IV. CHILEAN SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 
 
A. Industry background 
   Chilean contribution to the world supply of salmon has 
increased tremendously in the past 10 years (Figure 1). In 
2006, this industry exported approximately 628,000 tons 
(round and estimate) and earned 2 billion USD, making it a 
top exporter of farmed salmon in the world after Norway [25]. 
   The industry now includes diverse participants from the 
private, and public sectors at global, national and local level. 
Inclusion of a diverse array of actors and enlarged scale and 
scope of productive process multiplied the complexity in 
national regulatory system. This is particularly true in the 
2000s as firms increasingly needed to meet both local and 
global sanitary and environmental requirements. Here, two 
cases from different time periods are examined to demonstrate 
how the local regulatory system became complexity and 




Fig.1. Main exports of farmed salmon and trout, 1990-2007 
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B. Regulatory framework of salmon farming industry in Chile  
   There is several institutions involved in regulating the 
salmon farming industry. The way in which these institutions 
interact increasingly became complex due to the expansion 
and extension of the industrial structure. The main sectoral 
regulating body for the salmon industry is the Undersecretary 
of Fishery (Subsecretaria de Pesca) and the National Fishery 
Service (SERNAPESCA).  These institutions have belonged 
to the Ministry of Economy since 1976. As regards to the 
salmon farming industry, the Undersecretary of Fishery set 
rules for export purposes through adapting international 
regulations for local and sectoral contexts, obtaining 
information on sanitary regulations from the government of 
market destinations and acting as national guarantor on the 
products elaborated by the firms that are certified with their 
standards. The SERNAPESCA monitors firms, certifies the 
laboratories that examine the firms, enforce certification and 
grant certification to the firm in case of compliance. In the 
process of monitoring, it also promotes their standards through 
training and technical advice. The Undersecretary of Fishery 
also participates in the negotiation of regulatory matters both 
at bilateral and multilateral trade agreements (such as FTA and 
APEC).  
   There are several institutions that operate under national 
regulations related to the industry. Although these institutions 
do not directly interact nor address global private standards, 
the trajectory of national regulations is increasingly aligned to 
what is happening in the global context, due to the fact that a 
major proportion of the salmon is exported to developed 
markets. For instance, the Agriculture and Livestock Service 
(SAG: Servicio Agricola Ganadero), which belongs to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, regulates the chemicals used in fish 
rearing (such as vaccines) and fishfeed. These are essentially 
national regulations; however, because of traceability 
requirement, the global requirements are increasingly being 
reflected at the national level.   
 
   Above condition create the complex layers of regulation at 
the local level. For instance, a salmon processing plant is 
regulated by the municipal regulatory institution, 
Superintendent of Health and Sanitation Service (SISS), for 
sewage and effluence inland and the Maritime Authority 
(Chilean Navy) for sewage and effluence into the sea. 
Furthermore, SERNAPESCA deals with fish related diseases, 
yet the use of chemicals for fish and fishfeed is controlled by 
the Agriculture and Livestock Service that belongs to Ministry 
of Agriculture. There is increasing complexity in regulations 
and institutions as numerous small scale suppliers are involved 
at the local level while the traceability requirement at the 
global level also demands compliance with environmental and 
sanitary regulations at local level. 
 
    1) The case of sanitation and quality standards for salmon industry in the 
late 1980s. 
   The first attempt to create standards in the Chilean salmon 
industry took place in the late 1980s when they were 
competing against more well known producers of Canada, 
Norway and Scotland. Due to the intense competition, it 
became important to differentiate good Chilean products from 
inferior one through introducing ‘quality seal’ (sello de 
calidad) [26]. This ‘seal’ was created by Association for 
Producers for Salmon and Trout in Chile (APSTC later it 
became Association of Salmon Industry: SalmonChile), with 
technical cooperation from FundacionChile, a privately run 
institution. Parallel to this private initiative, the 
Undersecretary of Fishery also developed the Sanitary 
operation procedure standards (Procedimiento Operacion de 
Saneamiento:POS) for salmon industry, based on the 
international standard, 'Sanitary Standards Operation 
Procedure (SSOP)'. SSOP is a standard that comprises part of 
the! Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) . 
The Undersecretary of Fishery later created a standard called 
PAC (Program for Assurance of Quality), which is based on 
HACCP and made compliance obligatory for those firms who 
wished to export. The PAC eventually replaced ‘quality seal’.   
 
   2) The case of environmental standards in the 2000s. 
   In the 1990s and the 2000, the presence of Chilean salmon 
industry became prominent both at local and global levels. 
Increase in production corresponded with increase in 
environmental impact in various form such as solid and 
industrial waste, discharged water, oil spillage, alteration of 
natural habitats for sea mammals, biodiversity and scenic 
beauty. These issues fall into the jurisdiction of different 
public authorities at local and national levels. However, no 
specific regulation emerged to control the salmon industry per 
se. Under such circumstances, many regulatory institutional 
innovations occurred with increased participation of the 
private sector.  
   For instance, Environmental Regulations for Aquaculture 
(DS No.320: RAMA) and Sanitation Regulation (RESA) was 
established by the Undersecretary of Fishery, in the early 
2000s. Much of these were based on existing regulations in 
Norway and Scotland but the effectiveness of this regulation 
in local settings was investigated by the research institution 
owned by the Chilean association of salmon industry [27].  In 
addition to above, there is public-private collaboration in 
monitoring the compliance of national environmental 
regulations. The Clean Production agreement was made 
between National Council for Cleaner Production, group of 
local and national regulatory institutions and the Chilean 
salmon farming industry, headed by the association in 2001. 
The public regulators and the association agree to work 
together to monitor compliance with environmental standards 
by the firms. In addition to above, local standards were 
established. The Association of Chilean Salmon Industry 
(SalmonChile) created umbrella standards called SIGes 
(Sistema Integrado de Gestion) based on various standards 
specific to this sector such as HACCPs, RESA and REMA as 
well as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000.  This local standard 
facilitated the better access to information and training for 
firms. These standards also acted as a communication tool 
with other global players. For instance, in 2004, Wall-Mart 
accepted the SIGes as the procurement standards from Chile 
(SalmonChile 2007) and in 2003, the Association of salmon 
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producers of Americas (SOTA)  incorporated SIGs into their 
standards, SQF-SOTA [25].  
   In summary, the regulatory system and national institutions 
for the salmon industry co-evolved over the years. At the early 
stage of industry, there were not many regulations and the 
only regulations applied were standards that required for 
exports. For this purpose, initiatives were first taken by the 
private sector in setting up common quality standards to 
ensure quality for differentiation. This attempt by the private 
sector was soon taken up by the national authorities to create 
the national standards through unifying the existing several 
standards in developed countries and international 
organizations, diffusing information, enforcing and monitoring 
the compliance for the exporting firms. The involvement of 
public sector in standards legitimized private sectors’ products 
to penetrate into the global market in early stage. As industry 
grew and increased its complexity with local specification 
with scale and scope of production, institutional innovation 
started to emerge at national level so that the global standards 
can be accommodated better in the local context. In these local 
initiatives, national institutions are much more important in 
certifying and guaranteeing the product than actually 
enforcing and sanctioning. In sum, the regulatory framework 
for the Chilean salmon farming industry has transformed as 
the industry grew and became more globally integrated.  
 
V. MEXICAN EXPORT-ORIENTED FRESH PRODUCE INDUSTRY 
 
A. The industry and market at a glance 
   The trade relationship between United States and Mexico is 
part of a long term North American integration. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the 
opportunity to deepen their relations, increasing the 
intraregional trade share from 25% in 1989, to 40% in 1994, 
and 56% in 2003 [28]. In this context, the production and 
exports of fresh produce in Mexico had grown in value, led 
mainly by Sinaloa as the most important horticultural region in 
Latin America [29], and Sonora [30].  
 












Fig.2 Mexico and Sinaloa fresh produce exports to United States  
 
B. Engagement with and diffusion of international standards for food safety 
   In Mexico there are various regulatory institutions regulating 
and enforcing international food standards. There is the 
multilateral NAFTA commission related to Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS), based upon the Codex, the International 
Office of Epizootics, the International Plant Protection 
Convention, and the North American Plant Protection 
Organization  standards. There is also a decentralized multi-
governmental agency (Mexico Calidad Suprema: MCS), the 
official regulatory agency “Servicio Nacional de Sanidad 
Inocuidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria” (SENASICA), adhered 
to the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO); and the independent international third party 
certifications bodies such as Scientific Certification Systems 
(SCS), Primuslabs, and Quality and Management Innovation 
& Supreme Audit Institutions Global (QMI SAI Global). 
   In Mexico, there is interdependency between governmental, 
private, R&D centers, NGOs, consultation bodies, and 
industry associations for legislation (legitimating), execution 
(promotion and assisting), and enforcing  (monitoring) 
“voluntary” regulations/standards. Diffusion of standards goes 
through complex processes including: presence of 
international certifying bodies, accreditation of national 
organizations, state and industry awareness, demand for 
certifications services, coordinating with national and local 
(public and private) research and development centers in 
agricultural, and food and post-harvest science and 
technologist to supply faster services at lower costs. All these 
phases may happen in different orders, as will be shown 
following cases. 
 
C. National institutional capacity building 
   1) The case of Melones Internacionales (Melones) 
   In Mexico, there have been difficulties diffusing the 
standards due to lack of: (1) awareness; (2) resources for 
implementation; (3) regulatory stringency and; (4) certainty of 
benefits from early certification. However, the collaboration of 
among private firm with leadership of Melones, one of the 
largest fresh produce grower/shippers in Mexico, created an 
important impact on the diffusion of standards.  
   In 2001, as soon as Melones’ CEO discovered the 
importance of food safety standards while visiting a certified 
firm, Agros which as owned by the president of AMPHI 
(Mexican greenhouse growers association, now called 
AMHPAC: Asociacion Mexicana de Horticultura Protegida), 
started implementation and certification of food safety 
standards with SCS. This attempt was followed by the growers 
from Sinaloa, in 2002-3, with support from their association, 
the ‘Confederation of Agricultural Associations of the State of 
Sinaloa’ (CAADES: Confederacion de Asociaciones 
Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa) [31].  
   As can be seen, at least five private organizations (Agros, 
AMPHI, Melones, SCS and CAADES) played important roles 
in building up regulatory system at national level. Agros in 
1999 become a leading firm in implementing food safety 
standards and was benchmarked for its best practices. AMPHI 
promoted use of bioregulators in greenhouse and organic 
production systems; organized conferences for members with 
state of the art information on food safety provided by 
Mexican and US governmental agencies as well as scientists 
and academia specialized in the agribusiness industry. 
Melones’ social ties and spillover effects promoted and 
sustained a high demand for certifications in Sinaloa. SCS and 
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later PrimusLabs provided training and certifications. 
CAADES supported their farmers in the implementation 
process, contracting and delivering training, hiring consultants, 
and negotiating better deals for their members (more than 
10,000) in the purchase and adaptation of food safety 
infrastructure and technologies for their Good Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Practices (GAP and GMP) [31]. 
   Buyers increasingly required certifications to close deals 
with Mexican suppliers. The local/national public-private 
collaborations of the aforementioned organizations triggered a 
legitimating process, driven by the notion of having a common 
front against the risk of foreign markets using non-tariff 
barriers against Mexican growers, and having tools to 
negotiate international disputes [32]. 
 
2) The case of Mexico Calidad Suprema (MCS) 
   In 2002, Mexico Calidad Suprema(MCS), a public 
institution, was put in place with the aim of creating and 
promoting quality standards across the food industry in 
Mexico. MCS co-evolved with the demand for higher quality 
assurance by internal markets, and with demand of food safety 
and good agricultural practices by the US, European, 
Canadian and Japanese buyers. MCS consolidated various 
stringent international private standards into one certification 
system, reducing the regulatory complexity associated with 
the new regulatory regime, where there are a growing number 
of international standards. 
   The initial phases of diffusion required resources to make 
the industry aware, for promoting standards, implementation, 
and certification. MCS is non for profit and tries to reach the 
agriculture and food industry in Mexico and abroad, allocating 
resources for promotion, training and consulting services at 
low costs for entire international supply chains; 50% is paid 
by the firm (inside or outside Mexico) and 50% is covered by 
the Mexican Government. 
   However, because financial, technological and knowledge 
resources were scarce, MCS engaged in public-private 
institutional collaboration with associations, research centers, 
consultation bodies, provincial and local governments, federal 
agencies, financing institutions, network of growers and 
producers, other private international certifying bodies, so on. 
   The international legitimacy grew with agreements with 
Wal-Mart’s procurement department, GlobalGap, the Japan 
Ministry of Agriculture, and in progresses with SQF. 
Nevertheless, enforcement and sanctions under a voluntary 
scheme was left to the markets. 
   In summary, the Mexican fresh produce industry and public 
institutions acknowledge the need to be certified to minimize 
the risk of accusations of contamination of fresh produce, also 
to gain competitive advantage with early and stringent 
implementation of international private standards. Industry 
associations, national institutions and national research centers 
collaborate in acquiring and exploiting knowledge by means 
of trial and error process through development, training, 
managing and codifying complexity. This is facilitated by 
benchmarking practices and observation of other facilities, and 
human resources mobility. And public-private collaboration 
was necessary to achieve legitimacy of the adapted standards 
for the sectoral and local conditions.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
   The growing use of global private standards feared to take 
away governance power from national regulatory institutions, 
particularly from the developing countries with weaker 
regulational institutions. The cases of standards in Mexican 
vegetable and Chilean salmon farming industry demonstrate 
the changing nature of role of national regulatory institutions.  
   In the legislative function, the national institutions and 
private sectors are increasingly taking the role of ‘adaptors’ of 
global private standards, since no plain transfer of standards to 
national/local level but it increasingly required adaptation 
process to simplify to fit complex realities in the local and 
sectoral context. In the executive function, it became evident 
that private-public collaboration taking the important part in 
transforming the role from ‘promotion of standards’ to 
‘assistance’ to implementation diffusion of standards and 
regulation. In the judicial function, the market forces taking 
over the role of “sanctioning” from national institutions; on 
the other hand, national institutions increased function of 
‘legitimating’ through certifying and guaranteeing the good 
agricultural and manufacturing practices in the global market 
and before international trade disputes commissions. 
   The cases demonstrate the co-evolution of regulatory system 
in Mexico and Chile for agro-food sector as the sectors 
become globally integrated. The role of national regulatory 
institutions in this co-evolutionary process resembles that of 
Gerschenkron [33] which stated that government play role to 
fill the missing gaps created by the market forces as the 
developing countries go through transformation. As the cases 
demonstrated, he also believed the ways in which government 
fill the gaps are not the same due to the differences in 
preconditions: each situation requires plotting the distinctive 
path. However, this does not mean that things needs to be 
entirely new—the countries can follow the existing path of the 
predecessor, namely the global standards. In other words, the 
government may introduce “innovative features”, such as 
collaborating with the private sector to cope with the new 
environment which makes the what it appears to be the “top-
down” governance of global standards more a “bottom up” 
process of institutional innovation for complying with global 
standards involves series of economic actions and reactions as 
well as learning and institutional development. The future 
challenges for the national institutions in developing countries 
would be to involve further in defining standards at 
international level, at the same time that they maintain the role 
of impartial guarantor while sustaining close collaboration 





Authorized licensed use limited to: Georgia Institute of Technology. Downloaded on January 4, 2010 at 14:23 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
TABLE 1: SUMMAR OF CASES













































































In the 1980s: Sello de Calidad     
Industry Association (Association of 
Salmon Producers in Chile) 
          
Semi private institution (Fundacion 
Chile) 
        
PAC/OPS         
Undersecretary of Fishery        
National Fishery Service         
In the 2000s:SIGEs   
Industry Association (SalmonChile)          
Private Sector (Wal-Mart)        
Association of Canadian, Canadian 
and Chilean salmon producers 
(SOTA) 
           
              
Private sector: Case of Melones Internacionales   
Private (Melones)           
Industry Association (AMPHI, 
CAADES) 
        
Private (Agros)         
International certification body (SCS)         
Public sector: Case of Mexico Calidad Suprema (MCS) 
MCS         
Government (Minister of Economics, 
Minister of Agriculture, and Mexican 
International Trade Bank) 
       
Foreign Government (Minister of 
Agriculture) 
       
Private (NORMEX, PrimusLabs.com, 
Wal-Mart) 
       
Industry Associations (CAADES, 
AMPHI, FPAA) 
       
Public–Private consultation body 
(ANCE, COSAFI) 
          
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